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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ERNEST H. DEAN, et al.,
Respondents,
Case No- 14518
vs.
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, et al.,
Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

COME NOW the plaintiffs and respectfully petition this
Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled case.
This Petition is based on the following grounds.
POINT I
THIS COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF PRIOR APPROVAL ON PROPOSE^
EXPENDITURES.
In its decision of October 21, 1976, this Court found against
plaintiffs and in favor of defendants apparently on the basis that
Subsection (3) of Section 63-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, purports to exempt
members of the legislature from submitting the claims in question
to the Board of Examiners and, therefore, that it is in conflict
with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution of Utah and thus
is invalid to that extent.

This determination, in effect, broadens

the power of the Board of Examiners beyond any powers granted by the

Constitution.

If this decision stands uncorrected, the Board of

Examiners will henceforth have the power of prior approval of any
proposed budgetary expenditures in addition to its right to
approve claims, both liquidated and unliquidated.

Such prior approval

powers were nowhere given in the Constitution to the Board of
Examiners.

In fact, the only existing power of prior approval

in

the Board of Examiners was granted by the Legislature itself in Section
63-2-15(3), U.C.A. 1953, passed in 1941. Absent that statute, the
Board has only the " . . .

power to examine all claims against the

State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law. . .",
Section 13, Article VII. This new power was granted, rather, under
the additional provision of that Section which provides, "and
perform such other duties as may be

prescribed by law."

Admittedly this Court has laid to rest any issue of its
determination that the Board of Examiners can pass upon unliquidated
claims (those claims made in the absence of any legislative
appropriation or which are provided for by law but carry no means
for settlement) and liquidated claims (private claims against appropriated funds and agency claims against state appropriations).
In the case at bar, however, the Court is confronted with
neither a "liquidated" nor an "unliquidated" claim but, rather, a
proposed budgetary expenditure.

As the Court noted in its decision of

October 21, 1976, after the travel had been completed, the actual
and necessary expenditure receipts were properly submitted to the
Board and were refused solely due to the fact that, prior to incurring
the expenditures and, therefore, prior to having obtained a claim
against the State, plaintiffs failed to submit these proposed budgetary
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expenditures to the Board of Examiners for its prior approval.
No claim whatsoever by defendants is made that the travel was
not necessary and appropriate or that the expenses were not actual and
necessary.

Both of these items were stipulated by the parties at the

District Court level. The only basis for not allowing these claims,
therefore, was the failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the general
provisions of Section 63-2-15(3), which by itls own terms specifically
excluded plaintiffs from such requirement.

Tlhe Court, in finding that

the Board of Examiners properly refused payment, have created a new
area of power in the Board which was never intended by the founding
fathers.
To better understand the import of such a determination by this
Court, the historical development of the Board should be examined.
The Constitutional provision originally creating a Board of
Examiners with power to examine all claims was, and still remains,
somewhat ambiguous since it does not define the terms "examine11 or
"claim".

However, the 1896 Legislature attempted to outline the powers

and duties of the Board and establish such procedure. With the passage
of Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 1896, the Legislature established the Board's
duties as including the following, insofar as applicable to this matter:
"7. The Board shall receive claims for which an
appropriation exists and when apprbved, transmit
same to auditor for payment.
8. The Board shall receive claims for which n£
appropriation is made, the settlement of which is
provided by law, and transmit same to the Legislature
with a statement of approval.
9. Any claim, the settlement of which is not
provided for by law, must be received by the Board;
and on the first Monday in November preceding the
meeting of the Legislature, the Board must hold a
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session for the purpose of examining such claims.
An abstract of these claims must then be submitted
to the Legislature."
The first meeting of the Board of Examiners took place on
March 7, 1896, three days after the approval of the above legislation.
During the first two years most of the claims consisted of claims for
goods and services rendered to the Territorial Government for which
there was no appropriation, but which were required to be paid by law.
Thousands of these types of claims were presented to the new government
and required the determination of the Board whether the Territorial
Government would have been obligated.

An examination of these

determinations shows the Board submitting claims to the Legislature
for payment when no appropriation existed and denying payment of claims
which they deemed not to be "proper expenditures".

See Minutes of the

Meetings of the State Board of Examiners, pp. 5-8.

Claims for returning

prisoners, claims for bounties, claims for printing notices required by
law, and similar claims were first examined as part of the necessity
of clearing up the obligations of the Territorial Government.

This

type of claim continued after statehood and became typical of one type
of claim the Board of Examiners had to determine, that is, claims for
any activities or programs the cost of which is not readily ascertainable
in advance.
The second type of claims authorized by the 1896 Act, supra,
were the tort or contract actions wherein the claimant had been injured
by acts of the State.

Originally, due to sovereign immunity, any redress

had to be on moral, rather than legal, grounds.
Utah's constitutional and statutory law specifically provides
for relief from grievances or wrongs committed by the state which,
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except for sovereign immunity, would result in redress*

On these

items, the Board must first examine the claim and then forward it to
the Legislature for their action, whether approved of by the Board or
not.

The Legislature must then determine whether or not to

appropriate the monies therefore.

In this area, it appears that the

Board rejected claims they considered as "damage" claims and not legal
liabilities against the State.

Even though not considered by the

Board, the Legislature often assumed liability solely as a moral
obligation.

See Minutes of the Meetings, Vol. I, page 155, and Laws

of Utah 1896, Chapter 87.
The final category of claims is those claims established for which
the appropriation has been made.

The best example of this type of claim

is simply an agency demand against appropriated funds.

Laws of Utah 1896,

Chapter 35, Sections 7, 8 and 9 show that this type of claim requires
that the obligation already exist since it talks in terms of the Board
endorsing their signatures on the claim and the auditor drawing his
warrant for the amount approved.

The examination of this type of claim,

at least until 1941, constituted nothing more than an audit prior to
payment—an approach justified by the fact that the auditor was performing
the pre-audit and disbursing function.
It has been argued that the Board has both ministerial and
discretionary authority and that discretionary powers must include an
examination of proposed expenditures since, otherwise, it would merely
duplicate the auditor's duties and functions.

However, prior to 1941

the State auditor was not a post-auditor but, rather, the chief accounting
officer and disburser of State funds so the ai|idit function was not
a duplication but an important viable auditing role not encompassed
-5-

by any other state agency.

After all, the Board was originally

authorized by Laws of Utah 1896, Chapter 35, Sections 20, 21 and 22
and Chapter 102, to:
1.

Audit the books of the State Auditor.

2. Hire outside auditors when necessary to
audit books of all state officers and institutions.
3. Count the money in the State Treasury each
quarter without giving prior notice.
Another factor in the history of the Board which should be
considered in determining its power is that, from 1896 to 1921, in
addition to examining claims, it also functioned as a State Board
of Supplies and Furnishing.

Until 1921, the Board of Examiners was

given the statutory responsibility, as a Board of Supplies and
Furnishing, to:
1. Contract for furnishing of all stationery,
printing, binding, paper, fuel, lights and other
necessary supplies used by the Legislature and the
various departments. To receive all bids for same,
2. Hire all offices for the state; to furnish
and keep same in repair.
3. Examine, when necessary, the inventory
of all supplies and all accounts and vouchers
for such supplies.
4.

Hire clerical help for the various offices.

Thus, prior to 1921, the Board of Examiners did exercise
certain limited control over proposed expenditures but it did so as
a Board of Supplies and Furnishing, not as a Board of Examiners.
These additional powers were properly granted to the Board of
Examiners by statute pursuant to Article VII, Section 13, wherein it
states that the Board shall "perform such other duties as may be
prescribed by law."
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It is interesting to note that the Minuses of.the Meetings of
the State Board of Examiners does not list requests for clerical help or
requisitions for supplies as being claims.

They were, however, listed

as claims when an account had been submitted for payment of goods
received or services rendered.

At this point, the claim was numbered

and audited and an abstract of the claim made upon the Minutes of
the Meetings of the State Board of Examiners.

(See Volumes I and II.)

Until 1903 each claim was numbered and individually entered upon the
Minutes.

While the Minutes noted certain requests to hire clerical

help and purchase certain supplies, they were not listed as claims
but as requests to the Board of Supplies and Furnishing.
It should be noted further that not all purchases were made by
the Board of Supplies and Furnishing—only common supplies and
the hiring of clerical help.

In the case of outside purchases, the

Board of Examiners had no knowledge of the proposed expenditure until
a claim was submitted to the Board in the fori^i of an account.

Occasionally,

one will note upon reading the Minutes of the Meetings of the State
Board of Examiners that the Board rejected certain claims because the
agency incurring the obligation had not yet verified the expenditure.
From 1896 to 1921 major control over proposed expenditures rested with
the individual agencies.
Then, in 1921, the governor placed a comprehensive state
reorganization plan before the Legislature seeking to strengthen
administrative management by placing responsibility for all fiscal
affairs in the hands of the governor.

A Department of Finance and

Purchase resulted which was headed by a director appointed by, and
responsible to, the governor.

All of the powelrs and duties of the
-7-

Board of Supplies and Furnishing were transferred to this new department
which was to be a central purchasing office and budget management
department which had powers to:
1.

Establish a uniform system of accounting.

2. Standardize all salaries for clerical and
stenographic help.
3. Establish minimum work hours and related
personnel policies.
4. Examine all requisitions and proposed
expenditures of all state agencies.
5.

Contract for all purchases and sell same.

6. To hire all offices and furnish and keep
same in repair.
7. To investigate work arrangements and duplication of
effort.
8. To prepare the budget for the governor for
submission to the Legislature.
See Laws of Utah 1921, Chapter 127.

From that time until 1925,

this department had exclusive control over all proposed expenditures
and, for the first time, departments were forced to seek prior approval
on all purchases, supplies and personal services, and no payment would
be made by the auditor on any expenditure which did not receive such
prior approval. The Board of Examiners during this period continued
to examine claims against the State, but only obligations which had
been already incurred.

The Minutes of the Meetings of the State Board

of Examiners during this period suggests that the examination was somewhat
superficial; e.g., "Claims 01484 to 01863 inclusive, received from the
Department of Finance and Purchase, were approved by the Board and
forwarded to the State Auditor for payment."

Such did not, however,

inhibit the Board of Examiners from pulling out questionable claims
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(illegal or improper expenditures) and disallowing the same even though
the goods and services had been received.

(See Minutes, Vol. II.)

The Legislature apparently became disillusioned with the department
and, in 1925, refused to appropriate funds for the continued operation
of the department and its operations ceased soon thereafter.

In 1927,

the Legislature repealed the statutes creating the department and
created a State Board of Supplies and Purchase, over the veto of the
governor.

The formal title in this new act specifically provided:
M

An act relating to the civil administration
of State Government, enlarging the powers of the
State Board of Examiners; making that board a
board of supplies and purchase. . ."
Through this act the powers and authority of the old department of
finance and purchase, including budget preparation and the authority
to examine all proposed expenditures, a power not theretofor held by
the old Board of Supplies and Furnishing nor the old Board of
Examiners.

Otherwise, there would have been no reason to provide

these powers statutorily.

With the enactment of the 1927 act, the

Board was now responsible for the budget, personnel, all purchases,
accounting systems, and the examination of all proposed expenditures.
The Board was authorized to hire an executive secretary to examine
all proposed expenditures for the Board.

The major difference between

these provisions and the old Department of Finance and Purchase was
that the Board of Supplies and Purchase acted for the Board of
Examiners, not for the governor.
This arrangement was in effect until 1941, the Board of
Examiners assuming in large measure the role of chief executive,
exercising control over the preparation of the budget, all proposed
expenditures, personnel policies, purchasing, and the like.
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The present Department of Finance was created in 1941.

Pursuant

to that act, the governor was made responsible for the preparation
and execution of the budget including the examination of all proposed
expenditures.
10.

See Laws of Utah 1941 (First Special Session), Chapter

By that act (Sections 63-2-12 through 63-2-18, Utah Code Annotated

1953) the Department of Finance was to have powers including:
1. To prescribe and fix salaries for state officers
and employees where not fixed by law.
2.

Approve all requests for personnel.

3. Authorize travel expenses and establish regulations
governing same.
4. Purchase all supplies, equipment and services
for state agencies.
5.

Prepare the biennial budget for the governor.

6.

Miscellaneous other powers.

Additional strength was added to that department at the Second
Special Session in 1941. See Laws of Utah 1941 (Second Special
Session), Chapter 27. Among other changes, that act designated
the state auditor as a post auditor, authorized the Department of
Finance to maintain all State accounts, disburse funds, pre-audit
claims, and establish a uniform system of accounting for State
agencies.

Further, it directed the Department to establish and

maintain a budget control system, require work programs and approve
or disapprove of all proposed state expenditures.

These powers, then,

do not differ greatly from those held by the Board of Supplies and
Purchase.

In the case of the Department of Finance, however, the

governor was made responsible for the preparation and execution of the
budget, including the examination of all propsed expenditures.
is no mention of the Board of Examiners in the law.
-10-

There

In view of this history, there can be little question of the
intent of the 1941 Act.

However, in actuality the management of the

Department of Finance has become very much a part of the activities
of the Board of Examiners.

The Department has in practice been made

an arm or agent of the Board of Examiners, thus preventing the
separation of claims examination from the examination of proposed
expenditures.

There is no question that such a separation did exist

in practice between 1921 and 1927 although in 1927 the Board of
Examiners was given the additional authority to examine all proposed
expenditures.
In 1941, the attorney general issued an opinion stating that the
examination of proposed expenditures by the Department of Finance
in no way prohibited the Board of Examiners from examining actual
claims presented for those expenditures.

See Biennial Report of the

Attorney General, period ending June 30, 1942, page 83. However, on
June 30, 1941, the attorney general issued a second opinion wherein
he concluded that a "claim" included eyery type of commitment made
by the State and payable out of public monies.
139-140.

Biennial Report, pp.

The Board of Examiners followed this with a communication

to the Finance Commission stating, in part:
"As stated in the Attorney Generalfs opinion of
August 20, the procedure defined as aforesaid,
seems adequate to accomplish the objective of our
Constitutional provision in question. Naturally,
the Board of Examiners by its order this day made,
adopting and approving the said procedure, has
constituted the Commission of Finance its agent,
but the Board of Examiners is still held responsible
for the results obtained. In other words, by the
adoption of the outlined procedure, the Board of
Examiners, may not evade or pass to the Commission
of Finance its Constitutional responsibility. The
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Board of Examiners, must, therefore, reserve
supervisory control to the end that if, at any
time, the procedure should prove inadequate to
properly guard the public expenditures, the
Board may have an opportunity to correct an
irregularity found to exist. This, of course, means
that any time the Board sees fit to question any
commitment at any state of the procedure, it may do
so.H See Minutes of the Meetings, Vol. VIII, p. 1085.
Thus, despite the Legislative attempt to remove powers theretofor
given by it to the Board of Examiners, the Board took it upon
itself to determine that it would not release those powers.
Finally, in 1963, an attempt was made once again by the
Legislature to emphasize that the Board would not have the power
to examine proposed budgetary expenditures until they had cleared
the budgetary machinery and were, in fact, obligations on the part
of the State.

This Act was challenged, however, in Toronto vs.

Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 P 2d 795 (1964).
In the course of that decision, the Court indicated its feeling
that the framers of the Constitution had intended to vest in the
constitutional officers, ". . . more than a mere auditing function,
that is, power to examine into the adviseability and necessity of any
disbursement or proposed obligation of the state; and that this has
the effect of giving examiners general supervisory power over
expenditures by the state government" and, further, that:
"It is obvious that if the examiners could
not examine and pass upon expenditures before
obligations were incurred, their function as to
fiscal control would be greatly impaired, if
not entirely destroyed."
Similar statements had been made by the Court prior to the
Toronto decision in Wood vs. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P 2d 516 (1962)
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and Bateman vs. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P 2d 381
(1958).
In setting forth the foregoing history pf the Board!s powers,
the plaintiffs are by no means unmindful of those decisions and the
language set forth therein.
Plaintiffs respectfully contend, however, that the earlier
decisions of this Court stand in direct contradiction to such
expansive powers and have never been expressly overruled.

In fact,

the earlier cases would appear to be closer in time to the original
drafting of the constitutional article and more familiar with the intent
surrounding it.
In 1899 in Thoreson vs. State Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18,
60 Pac. 982

(1899), the Legislature made an Appropriation for the

payment of monies improperly received by the State and directed the
Board to receive audit and allow just claims for such reimbursement.
There, as in the case at bar, the appellant admitted the facts
showing that the claim was a just one; but updn rehearing (21 Utah 187),
the Board claimed that a claim for payment wa^ not first presented to
the Board pursuant to Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah
Constitution.

The Court responded to that claim by explaining that

the respondent:
"Never had any claim against the territory, and did not
have any against the state until the passage of Section
963, Rev. Stat., nor was the state under any,
except a moral, obligation to pass an act for the
relief of such persons."
Therefore, that section of the Utah Constitution had no relevancy.
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Further, in Bateman, supra, the Court indicated that "claim"
was used in its broadest connotation susceptible of various meanings and
then set forth examples as:
" . . . ranging from a moral claim; or the seeking
of legislative largesse; or asserting a privilege;
to asserting rights to compensation for property
or materials furnished, or salary for services
rendered, to the state."
It should be noted that nowhere in those examples of various
meanings of "claim" is the concept of approval on proposed expenditures
set forth.

All of the items referred to are actual "claims"

where a present right or privilege for recompense exists.
Plaintiffs respectfully contend that the history of the Board
and this Court's earlier decisions properly indicate that the
powers of the Board must be deemed limited to the examination of
actual "claims" against the State rather than all proposed budgetary
expenditures, notwithstanding the language in Toronto.
POINT II
A DETERMINATION OF THIS COURT THAT THE BOARD
OF EXAMINERS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF PRIOR APPROVAL ON PROPOSED EXPENDITURES
WOULD DESTROY THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT.
As noted in Point I, the history of the Board and the
language of this Court in its earlier decisions and, particularly, in
the Thoreson

case

, supra, indicates that the Board of

Examiners' constitutional power was limited to actual existing
claims against the State and any power of approval of proposed
budgetary expenditures existed in the Board only as temporarily
granted by the Legislature,

It will be noted that such grants of
-14-

power, like in Section 63-2-15, have generally excluded control
over the Legislature.
legislative power.

This has not been simply due to jealousy of the

It is simply that such power cannot be logically

applied to the Legislative Branch.

This Court's apparent determination

that the Board of Examiners now has the constitutional power of prior
approval of proposed budgetary expenditures, even over the Legislature,
demonstrates the crucial problems which result from such an extension.
Throughout the Constitution and throughput the history of this
State, there has never been any question but that the Legislature
has the ultimate control on the "purse strings" of the State and has
the power to determine what expenditures should be made by way of
appropriations of proposed expenditures of the various departments
and agencies of the State.

The decisions of jthis Court have hereto-

for engrafted the exception upon that concept that the Board of
Examiners shall have the power to approve the actual expenditures
of those appropriations by those agencies.

However, if the present

decis.ion of this Court remains uncorrected, the Legislature is placed
into a position where it must obtain the approval of the Board of
Examiners of its budgetary appropriations for the State prior to
passing the same.

Clearly such a situation w£s never intended by

the founding fathers.

Otherwise, why have the governor responsible

for the preparation of a proposed budget and submission of the same to
the Legislature?
Taken one step further, why have a Legislature at all, for what
use could the Legislature be?

All bills proposed in the Legislature

carry a "fiscal note" which indicates the costs which will result or
the appropriations which will be required if the bill is passed into
-15-

law.

The language of this Court would seem to indicate that the

Legislature would henceforth be required to obtain the approval of the
Board before any such bill could be passed, since the bill would
constitute a proposed budgetary expenditure.

Plaintiffs cannot

believe that this Court intended, by this decision, to engraft such
an extension of the power on the Board of Examiners to the
exclusion of the Legislative purpose.

Certainly in view of the

minimal debate engendered by Article VII, Section 13, at the
Constitutional Convention, no such radical concept was indicated
by the founding fathers.
CONCLUSION
If the Court is indicating in its present decision that the
founding fathers intended that the Board of Examiners was to control
all of the operations of this State to the exclusion of the
Legislative Branch, then there can be no question but that plaintiffs
were properly excluded from payment for their out-of-state travel
and that the Legislature must henceforth submit all proposed
Legislative enactments to which would result in the expenditures of
monies to the Board of Examiners for their prior approval before
enacting such legislation into law.

If, on the other hand, the Board

of Examiners does not have the constitutional power of prior
approval of proposed expenditures before claims for payment are
submitted, then there is no basis upon which the reimbursement of
plaintiffs1 travel expenses were withheld.

Plaintiffs1 respectfully

submit that the power of the Board of Examiners to prior approval of
proposed expenditures must be deemed to exist only as granted by the
Legislature itself and not as granted by the Constitution.
-16-

It is

for this reason that plaintiffs seek clarification of the
pronouncements rendered by this Court and urge reconsideration of
the Court's decision.
Respectfully submitted,
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL

Melvin E. Leslie
General Counsel

Gary,e^Afki n
Staf£-<oun:
bunsel
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C E R T I F I C A T E
Delivered a copy of thi foregoing Plaintiffs' Petition for
ehearing and Brief in Support The eof to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney
ieneral for the state of Utah and

aul M. Tinker, Assistant Attorney General,

ttorneys for Defendants, Room 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
4th day of November, 1976.
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